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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MATTHEW JAY HULL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
CaseNo.20051001-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2002). The Honorable Judge, Terry Christiansen, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah entered judgment of conviction on October 3,2005 for Retail Theft, a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (2003). A copy of the 
judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Hull to serve 
his sentence consecutively with time already being served when the court did not 
consider all legally relevant factors. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a decision to impose consecutive 
sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally 
relevant [sentencing] factors, "YState v.McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)(citation omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give "'adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances.'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, H 15, 40 P.3d 626 (citation 
omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 53:3-4 where defense counsel requested 
completion of the ACES program in combination with the completion the REAP program 
once Mr. Hull had completed prior sentence in lieu of jail time. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
The text of the following statute is in Addendum B.-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 25, 2005, Matthew Jay Hull ("Mr. Hull"), pled guilty to one count of 
retail theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (2003). R. 
31-32;52. The trial court ordered adult probation and parole to conduct a pre-sentence 
investigation and prepare a pre-sentence report. Id. On October 3, 2005, the trial court 
sentenced Mr. Hull to a term of 365 days at the jail with 180 days of that suspended. R. 
53:6. Additionally, Mr. Hull was ordered to complete the CATS program. Id. He was 
ordered to pay a fine of $2,500.00 that was suspended. Id. Mr. Hull was also ordered to 
pay $300.00 in attorney fees with interest. Id. Mr. Hull was placed on probation for 18 
months following his release to be regulated by adult probation and parole. Id. The jail 
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term of 185 days was ordered to be served consecutively to time Mr. Hull was currently 
serving for another case. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Hull pled guilty to class A misdemeanor retail theft. R. 31-32. The facts 
alleged in the Information are that Mr. Hull was witnessed by an employee of Gart Sports 
extracting golf clubs from his pants, dropping them on the floor, and then attempting to 
leave the retail store. R. 2. At sentencing, the trial court inquired whether there needed 
to be any changes to the presentence report and defense counsel requested a few 
corrections. R. 53:2. The first change concerned the circumstances of Mr. Hull's arrest. 
Mr. Hull clarified that none of the employees of the retail shop had to physically detain 
him in order for him to comply with their demands. Id. The trial court commented: "I'll 
strike that. I don't think it really makes any difference on the Court's sentence. In any 
event, I'll strike that." Id. Mr. Hull also contested a 1999 Riverdale retail theft charge 
and the details of quality and commencement of Mr. Hull's drug use. Id. at 2-3. Then 
defense counsel argues that Mr. Hull was currently serving a sentence, currently 
participating in the REAP program, and once released from jail was to receive out-patient 
treatment through the ACES program. Id. at 3. Defense counsel requested that 
completion of these programs and Mr. Hull's current jail time being served for another 
sentence fulfill the jail time and probation that adult probation and parole requested Mr. 
Hull serve. Id. at 4. Additionally, Mr. Hull added that he has six children for whom he 
must provide child support. Id. at 5. 
The trial court asked Mr. Hull whether he was "stealing to support a drug habit?" 
3 
Id. Mr. Hull answered that he didn't necessarily think that was the case. Id. The trial 
court responded" "[w]ell, I'm really concerned. You had that condition since 1992, have 
another retail theft charge that's pending, you've got a poor record of compliance with 
court orders and probation." Id. Defense counsel interjected that the pending retail theft 
charge was actually an old charge that somehow got lost in the system. Id. at 6. The trial 
court responded: 
[m]y concern is just a substantial number of retail theft convictions and drug use is 
the genesis for these type of cases, probably 90 percent of them and unless we get 
the drug problem resolved, you're going to go back and you're going to do the 
same thing that you've been doing since 1992. Whatever happened in the past 
obviously hasn't been enough to solve the problem and my feeling is the CATS 
program would be a substantial benefit to the defendant. I don't necessarily want 
him to stay in jail for a full year, but I do want him to take the CATS program. 
Id. at 7. The trial court then imposed sentence and the consecutive sentencing scheme. 
Id. This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because it did not consider 
all legally relevant factors. The presentence report was silent about whether Mr. Hull's 
sentence should run consecutive to time already being served, yet the trial court 
sentenced Mr. Hull to consecutive sentences without stating a basis that complied with 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 and the basis for imposing consecutive sentences cannot be 
assumed from the record. While the trial court acknowledged the presentence report, it 
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implied that certain mitigating information in the report that defense counsel clarified at 
sentencing would not make a difference toward the sentence the trial court imposed. 
Rather, the trial court merely focused on Mr. Hull's past criminal record, without 
mentioning other legally relevant factors. Mr. Hull preserved this issue, but even if this 
Court finds he didn't, the error was plain. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
WITHOUT CONSIDERING ALL LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS. 
While a trial judge has discretion in imposing sentence, a trial court abuses that 
discretion when it imposes consecutive sentences without considering all relevant factors. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences since 
the trial court failed to consider all legally relevant circumstances including the "gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). 
Moreover, "[concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones." State v. Perez, 
2002 UT APP 211,1f 43, 52 P.3d 451. 
Trial courts generally have "'wide latitude and discretion in sentencing,'" 
appellate courts will reverse a decision to impose consecutive sentences when the trial 
court abuses its discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  8, 40 P.3d 626 (further 
citations omitted). A trial court that imposes consecutive sentences "abuses its discretion 
in sentencing when, among other things, it 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors.'" 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2003) outlines the requirements for imposing 
consecutive sentences. It states in relevant part: 
(2) In determining whether the state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(2). Pursuant to this provision, a trial court must consider the 
"gravity and circumstances of the offenses . . . and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id.; see also Helms, 2002 UT 12 at f^ 9. 
Utah appellate courts have found an abuse of discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences in several cases. For example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), the 
supreme court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences because it ignored the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Id. at 244-45. The 
defendant in that case had been convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child and 
two counts of sodomy on a child. Id. at 238. The trial court imposed consecutive 
sentences because the crimes were heinous, the defendant was a pedophile, and although 
the defendant's victimization as a child was a mitigating factor, obtaining help was his 
responsibility. Id. at 244. Although these factors weighed in favor of consecutive 
sentences, the failure to consider all factors required a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 
244-45. 
Similarly, in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), the supreme court held that 
the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because it failed to 
consider mitigating circumstances. Id. at 938. Despite the seriousness of Galli's 
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convictions, the consecutive sentences were vacated because the trial court did not 
consider Galli's rehabilitative needs and mitigating circumstances. Id.; see also State v. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993)(consecutive sentences reversed because the 
trial court failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his 
extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes," and "rob[bed] the Board of 
Pardons of flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner"). 
In contrast to cases overturning consecutive sentence orders, this Court upheld a 
consecutive sentence order in State v. Schweitzer because the record demonstrated that 
the mitigating information was presented to the trial court. 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). Since the information presented to the trial court supported the court's 
finding that the defendant was "'out of control'" and a "'clear and present danger'" as 
well as the trial court's "ultimate conclusion to sentence defendant to serve consecutive 
prison and jail terms," this Court upheld the consecutive sentencing order. Id. Moreover, 
because the consecutive sentences of two-to-five years and six months in jail did not 
significantly impact on the Board's flexibility to parole the defendant earlier, this Court 
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences in 
Schweitzer. Id. at 652-53. 
When a trial court does not make findings as to the basis for the imposition of 
consecutive sentences and the consideration as to the relevant factors, appellate courts 
will uphold the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences if it is reasonable to 
assume that the court considered all appropriate factors. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at f^ 11. 
Appellate courts will not, however, assume that the trial court considered all required 
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factors and made appropriate findings in circumstances where the record does not support 
such findings. Id. Accordingly, an appellate court will not assume that a trial court 
considered all relevant factors and made findings in support of an order "where (1) an 
ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides 
that written findings must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings on an issue 
must be made." Id. 
Although the trial court did not make findings regarding its sentencing order in 
Helms, the Court held that the record amply demonstrated that the trial court 
appropriately imposed consecutive sentences. Id. at }^ 13. The Court could assume that 
the trial court in Helms considered all legally relevant factors and made findings to 
support the consecutive sentencing order even though the court had not entered detailed 
findings because the trial court stated that it had carefully gone over the extensive 
presentence report in that case. Id. That presentence report covered all of the legally 
relevant sentencing factors including the "'gravity and circumstances of the offenses'" 
and the "'history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court did not consider all legally 
relevant sentencing factors and that it cannot be assumed that the trial court made 
findings in accordance with its consecutive sentencing order. R. 53. The trial court in 
this case imposed a consecutive sentencing order without addressing all legally relevant 
sentencing factors. The trial court stated: "One hundred and eighty days in jail. That will 
be consecutive with any time you're now serving. I'm not going to reward you for 
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committing multiple violations, but I am ordering you to complete the CATS program." 
R.53:6-7. The trial court suggested Mr. Hull's past record and drug habit was its sole 
consideration at sentencing, stating: "Well, I'm really concerned. You had that condition 
since 1992, have another retail theft charge that's pending, you've got a poor record of 
compliance with court orders and probation." R. 53:5. 
Additionally, the trial court generalized Mr. Hull's case rather than evaluating the 
legally relevant factors unique to Mr. Hull's case beyond Mr. Hull's criminal record. The 
trial court commented: "[m]y concern is just a substantial number of retail theft 
convictions and drugs is the genesis for these types of cases, probably 90 percent of them 
and unless we get the drug problem resolved, you're going to go back and you're going 
to do the same thing that you've been doing since 1992." Id. at 6. The trial court did not 
address mitigating factors, such as the fact that Mr. Hull was already involved in the 
REAP program that included Narcotics Anonymous and addiction programs, nor that Mr. 
Hull was to be completing out-patient treatment through the ACES program. Id. at 4. 
Unlike Helms where the supreme court concluded that the trial court had 
considered all legally relevant factors because it indicated on the record that it had 
reviewed the presentence report, the record in this case does not demonstrate that the trial 
court considered all legally relevant factors. The trial court did ask if the presentence 
report needed any correction, but merely commented regarding the requested changes: 
"I'll strike that. I don't think it really makes any difference on the Court's sentence. In 
any event, I'll strike that." R. 53:2. However, those corrections the trial court noted were 
inconsequential to sentencing were mitigating circumstances the trial court should have 
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considered in imposing sentence. Id. at 2-3. The trial court did not make any more 
specific mention of the information in the presentence report. The presentence report did 
not make any specific recommendation for consecutive or concurrent sentencing. R.37. 
Thus, the trial court should have considered all legally relevant factors in making that 
determination. 
Likewise, a review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did not consider 
other mitigating factors in deciding to impose consecutive sentences. First, the gravity 
and circumstances of the crime supported concurrent sentences. Mr. Hull pled guilty to a 
single count of retail theft, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
602 (2003). R. 31-32. An employee at the retail store saw Mr. Hull extracting golf clubs 
from his pants, placing them on the floor of the store, and attempting to leave the store 
without any merchandise on his body. R.2. Consequently, as no actual theft occurred 
there were no victims in this crime, so the lack of victims worked in favor of concurrent 
sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. 
Rather than following the statute and considering the gravity and circumstances of 
the crime, the number of victims, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for 
reasons that are not completely clear from the record. This failure to consider all legally 
relevant factors prejudiced Mr. Hull since Mr. Hull was unable to complete the 
alternative rehabilitative programs suggested by defense counsel. The trial court 
therefore abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. 
This issue was preserved by counsel's discussion of completion of rehabilitative 
programs in lieu of jail time and probation. R. 53:3-4. The trial court was fully aware 
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that Mr. Hull wanted his current jail time to be sufficient to fulfill any sentence of 
incarceration and the trial court had the opportunity to consider the request. Id. 
Requesting a lighter sentence is sufficient to preserve this issue for review. See Helms, 
2002 UT 12, HI 8-16; State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ^ 11, 82 P.3d 1167; Perez, 
2002 UT App 211, U 48; State v. Thomas, 2006 UT App 106,11 fnl (unpublished). This 
issue can also be reviewed for plain error since the failure to consider all legally relevant 
factors was obvious under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) and Utah case law. See e.g. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  8. Plain error exists when: (1) an error occurs, (2) the error is 
obvious, and (3) the error results in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1202, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). "The plain error rule permits the appellate court to assure 
that justice is done, even if counsel fails to act to bring a harmfully erroneous ruling to 
the attention of the trial court." State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996)(citations 
omitted). 
This error was obvious under the relevant statute and existing case law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) and Utah case law make it clear that a trial judge is required to 
"consider the gravity and circumstances of the crime, the number of victims, and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" when deciding whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
As outlined supra, the record does not reflect that the trial judge in this case 
considered all legally relevant factors, those factors worked in favor of concurrent 
sentences, and the trial court did not articulate a reason for deviating from the 
recommendation of concurrent sentences. Under the dictates of the statute and case law, 
n 
the trial court's error in failing to consider all relevant factors was obvious. Moreover, 
the error was prejudicial because the trial court imposed a harsher sentence without 
considering all the factors that would have weighed in favor of concurrent sentences. It 
was also prejudicial because Mr. Hull received consecutive sentences despite the fact the 
presentence report did not recommend this and Mr. Hull had several mitigating factors 
that were ignored by the trial court in sentencing. 
In this case, the factors outlined in section 76-3-401 all supported concurrent 
sentences. The circumstances of the crime did not support consecutive sentences. 
Instead, the circumstances were not grave and involved a relatively minor situation where 
store employees noticed Mr. Hull abandoning what may have been an attempt of theft, 
thus there were no victims. The presentence report did not make a recommendation as to 
whether the sentence given should be concurrent or consecutive. While Mr. Hull has a 
record, they were mainly minor arrests and Mr. Hull was involved in rehabilitative 
programs and planned to continue in those programs after incarceration. Under these 
circumstances where there were no factors that would justify consecutive sentences, the 
trial court erred in failing to consider all legally relevant factors in deciding to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Mr. Hull respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence and remand for resentencing. 
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SUBMITTED this 3 0 day of March, 2006. 
? TVRTT1UPTFT F» U JOSK E. BRUMFIELD 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant. 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW JAY HULL, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051400273 FS 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: October 3, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mindyg 
Prosecutor: MCKINNON CRANDALL, KIMBERLY A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, STEPHEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 4, 1966 
Audio 
Tape Number: 5101 Tape Count: 1042 
CHARGES 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) 
Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 08/25/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
(amended) - Class A 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Paqe 1 
Case No: 051400273 
Date: Oct 03, 2005 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500 . 00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $2500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $3 00.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
& Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 185 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Comply with Adult Probation and Parole. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Timely payments of all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Not to possess/consume alcohol or non prescribed controlled 
substance. 
Randon urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Notify probation agent of any prescribed medication. 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are being used or are the chief item of sale. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Enroll and complete the CATS and aftercare program. 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education. 
Paae 2 
Case No: 051400273 
Date: Oct 03, 2005 
Deft to complete a Theft class through AP&P 
Dated this day of , 20 
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
District Court Judge 
D a n o *3 11 ^ r>.4- ^  
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order 
of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the 
court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided 
under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty 
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing 
by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as 
follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently 
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any 
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served 
under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the 
person is located. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-602 
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for 
sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such 
merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the retail value of 
such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of value 
or any other markings which aid in determining value of any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and 
attempts to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at 
less than the retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail 
value of such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a 
retail mercantile establishment from the container in or on which such 
merchandise is displayed to any other container with the intention of depriving the 
merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value 
of the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile 
establishment with the intent of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or 
benefit of such cart. 
